The Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit by Geoffrey H. Moore & Philip A Klein
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit





Chapter Title: The Concept of Credit Quality
Chapter Author: Geoffrey H. Moore, Philip A Klein
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1457
Chapter pages in book: (p. 38 - 55). TheConcept of Credit Quality
In most discussions of consumer "credit quality," first consideration is
given to the terms on which credit is granted. In 1955 Allan Sproul,
then president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, directed atten-
tion to the problem in this way: "I am disturbed not by the total
amount of consumer credit, but by the fact or the indication that
successive relaxation of terms has been largely responsible for keep-
ing the ball in the air. This is a process which cannot go on indefi-
nitely."
There is a strong suggestion here that quantitative changes were
being brought about by changes in quality,2 and that the process might
have undesirable consequences. Analysis of this process will be aided
by defining and measuring credit quality as precisely as possible,
so that the effect of changes in it can be identified.
The consumer credit industry has long recognized the need for
maintaining "sound terms," but there has never been any agreement
within the industry on how to define these terms. Some early attempts
were made to use specific characteristics of the loan contract for this
purpose, but these broke down because the guidelines were never very
clear. Again, there have been efforts within the industry to define
credit terms as sound if the loan was granted on a collateralized basis.
The collateralized definition suggests that terms may safely be liberal-
ized as long as the value of the note outstanding will at no time during
the life of the contract exceed the market value of the commodity
covered by the loan.3 Others emphasize the character and capacity of
'Allan Sproul, "Reflections of a Central Banker," Journal of Finance, March
1956, p. 11.
2Forsome evidence on this point, see Appendix G.
'For a brief statement of this position, see Thomas WI. Rogers, Easy Credit
Can be Tough, American Finance Conference, December 1955.Concept of Credit Quality 39
the borrower, rather than the terms on which he borrows, as the es-
sential ingredient of loan quality.
Loan terms and borrower characteristics, however, constitute only
one aspect of the concept of credit quality, albeit an important one.
To quote an earlier paper, "Deterioration of credit quality can
mean at least four different things: (1)adecline in actual quality, as
indicated by lossrates,foreclosure rates,default or delinquency
rates determined after the event ...(2)a decline in estimated quality
as indicated by loss reserves, interest differentials, examiners' apprais-
als, and the like; (3) a shift toward types of loan contracts or types of
borrowers that may be expected to involve higher delinquency or loss
rates; or (4) a change for the worse in the economic prospects of
debtors."
It is important to note that deterioration in credit quality is not
necessarily synonymous with a reduction of standards on the part of
lenders. Such a reduction may be the cause of the deterioration de-
scribed in the first definition cited, and it is suggested by the third
definition (although the shift mentioned may take, place not because
lenders relax their standards but because the relative volume of credit
handled by lenders with lower standards increases). The other two
definitions of quality deterioration do not necessarily imply a lowering
of standards on the part of lenders, although the second definition does
imply a shift in the way lenders appraise their standards.
This distinction between credit standards and credit quality is im-
portant- because some deterioration in quality may well be viewed as a
necessary accompaniment to any expansion in credit. The major policy
implications have to do with the question of how far the credit deterio-
ration can safely go. This in turn can be answered only if we know
how far it has in fact gone and what the consequences may be.
The distinction between credit standards and credit quality can per-
haps be clarified by the distinction between ex ante and ex post quality,
a distinction utilized extensively in the analysis below. By ex ante
quality is meant the prospective risk attached to a given volume of
credit. A decline in ex ante quality, therefore, means an increase in
Otto C. Lorenz, in The American Banker, April 25, 1957, stated: "Successful
consumer credit operators will tell you, quite simply, that loan quality is the
customer's character, ability, and willingness to pay. That's basic."
Geoffrey H. Moore, "The Quality of Credit in Booms and Depressions,"
Journal of Finance, May 1956, p. 293.40 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
loans which possess characteristics of one sort or another whichmay
be expected on the basis of past experience at the time the loans are
made to result in increased delinquency, repossession, or loss rates.
The bases upon which these expectations are formulated are indi-
cated in the third definition cited above, and the credit market's actual
evaluation of them is described by the measures in the second defini-
tion.
Ex ante quality may be said to deteriorate when there is deteriora-
tion in the conditions of lending that pertain to risk. These conditions
in turn consist of the terms on which credit is extended and the
characteristics of the borrowers who obtain it. Credit terms, as used in
this study, include primarily the percentage which the down payment
constitutes of the amount paid for the product, the number of months
for which the credit contract is drawn, and related variables such as
the cash selling price of the car or the trade-in allowance (which is
sometimes taken into consideration by expressing the down payment
as a ratio to the "real" car price rather than to the contract price,
which may include an inflated trade-in allowance). The borrower
characteristics relevant to ex ante quality are those that pertain to or
reflect willingness and ability to repay debt. In the following pages
much attention will be directed to the question of whether greater
risk is attached to borrowers possessing such characteristics as youth,
low income, or unstable employment than to other borrowers not
possessing these characteristics. The hallmark of ex ante quality de-
terioration, therefore, is a change in loan terms or borrower charac-
teristics such that, other things remaining the same, worsened collec-
tion experience may be expected to result.
Ex post quality, on the other hand, refers to actual collection ex-
perience on a given volume of loans and is measured by such factors as
delinquency rates, repossession rates, and loss rates (cf. the first defi-
nition above). Though it may be a major determinant, ex ante quality
is not the sole determinant of ex post quality. The latter is determined
partly by changes in economic conditions or collection policy subse-
quent to the granting of the loans whose quality is under considera-
tion (as the fourth definition implies). Hence it is possible that a de-
terioration in ex ante quality, brought about, say, by a change in
credit standards, may not be followed by adecline in ex postConcept of Credit Quality 41
quality if economic conditions improve sufficiently tooffset the
change.
In short, to analyze prospective risk and actual collection experience
on a given volume of loans, one must study lending terms and bor-
rower characteristics at the time the loans were made as well as subse-
quent changes in economic conditions and collection policy. It is to
the isolation, analysis, and evaluation of these strategic variables that
the present study is devoted. We shall not, incidentally, concern our-
selves with a related question—namely, to what extent lenders attempt
to offset the greater risk of easier credit standards by charging higher
rates. The National Bureau's study of consumer finance rates, under
the direction of Robert P. Shay, is concerned, in part, with this prob-
lem. Shay's tentative results do not suggest that there is any close ad-
justment of rates to prospective risk as indicated by credit terms or
borrower characteristics.6
Before turning in Chapter 3 to a consideration of the relations be-
tween credit conditions and collection experience, it is appropriate to
consider briefly the interrelations among the several aspects of credit
conditions. These aspects—down payments, maturities, and various
borrower characteristics—together make up what we have termed ex
ante quality. Conceivably, easier terms may be associated with an im-
provement in the borrower's creditworthiness, so that these shifts in
ex ante quality offset one another. Or longer maturities may go hand
in hand with larger down payments, so that an easing in one direction
is offset by tightening in another. But is this usually the case, or is
the opposite association more typical? By first looking at the evidence
on this point, we shall be in a better position to study the relation be-
6Forexample, in our analysis of the 1954—55FederalReserve survey of new-
auto contracts (Table 36), we find that repossession and delinquency rates vary
sharply with the size of down payment and the liquid assets held by the bor-
rower. But the finance rates paid do not appear to vary systematically with either
down payments or liquidasset holdings, or, indeed, with the corresponding
repossession and delinquency rates. The average finance rates corresponding to
the entries in Table 36 are:
Liquid Asset Effective Down Payment (%)
Holdings ($) Under 30 30—39 40 and over
None 11.1 11.1 10.2
1—499 11.2 10.6 12.1
500—1,999 11.0 10.6 11.4
2,000 & over 10.7 11.2 10.542 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
tween credit conditions and collection experience, because much of
the evidence on the latter takes into account only one kind of condi
tion at a time.
MATURITIES AND DOWN PAYMENTS
Data provided by a large sales finance company for the United States
as a whole and for separate regions make it possible to examine the
interrelationbetween down payments andcontractmaturities.
Table 16 shows the median maturity for new-automobile credit con-
tracts classified according to down payment percentage in July 1956.
The results, both for the country as a whole and for the individual
regions, suggest that (1)thecontracts in the highest down payment
group (50 per cent and over) have decidedly shorter maturities than
those with smaller down payments; (2) maturities are progressively
longer the smaller the down payment, up to a point; and (3) beyond
that point (down payments about 25 per cent) maturities tend to be
somewhat shorter. In general, low down payment contracts have
longer maturities than high down payment contracts; that is, terms
are eased in both directions at once. The relation noted has been
tested by means of chi-square analysis and has been found to be
statistically significant in each region.8
Table 17 shows the median down payment percentage for contracts
classified by maturity. Again the conclusion which emerges is that
the down payment percentages are typically larger when the maturi-
ties are shorter, and smaller when the maturities are longer. This re-
lationship is evident to some extent for every region as well as for the
United States as a whole. It is noteworthy, however, that the very
longest maturity contracts often have somewhat higher down pay-
ment percentages than those of intermediate maturity, just as the very
smallest down payment contracts had somewhat shorter maturities
than those with down payments of intermediate proportions. This sug-
The regional data utilized here and in subsequent sections are based on
samples of actual contracts purchased through the branch offices of a large sales
finance company, and consist of all contracts purchased during the first ten days
of the month, collected periodically since 1953. VVe have examined three of these
surveys, for June 1953, July 1956, and July 1957, but the present discussion is
confined to the July 1956 survey. See Appendix B.
8 For an explanation of the chi-square test, see Appendix B. The 5 per cent
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CHART6
Changein Down Payments and Maturities on New-Automobile
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Change in percentage of contracts with down payment less than 33 percent
SOURCE:Table G-l. Data from a large sales finance company; 1955—56basedon
January and April.
gests that lenders place some restriction on one dimension of the credit
contract when the other is being extended, presumably to limit the
risk.
The regional evidence that small down payments and long maturities
tend to occur together is supported by examination of local area data
on changes in these two aspects of credit quality. Chart 6, based on
data from another large sales finance company for twelve metropolitan
areas, illustrates the point well.9 Whereas the regional evidence per-
tained to only one point in time, Chart 6 relates to changes over time.
Year-to-year changes in the percentage of contracts issued with ma-
turities twenty-five months or longer are compared with correspond-
ing changes in the proportion of contracts with down payments less
than 33 per cent. For all areas and for all three yearly changes a large
increase in long-maturity paper is generally associated with a large









U46 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
increase in low-down-payment paper, and vice versa. The positive
association justifies the conclusion that these two factors, more often
than not, move together so as to magnify rather than offset the qualita-
tive implications of either one.
LOAN TERMS AND BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS
Do the borrowers who obtain credit contracts involving low down
payments or long maturities differ in relevant characteristics from
those who obtain credit on less easy terms? It is important to con-
sider this question because itisa necessary step in determining
whether any observed relation between credit terms and collection ex-
perience merely reflects an association between the terms and some
more fundamental characteristic of the borrowers, or whether the
terms themselves have an independent bearing on collection experi-
ence. There is another reason also. If it can be shown that those
borrower characteristics that are associated with poor collection ex-
perience are often found in loans with terms that are also associated
with poor collection experience, these two factors may reinforce one
another in accounting for changes in ex post quality. If the reverse is
true, they may offset one another. We wish, therefore, to know what
types of borrowers obtain the "easiest" terms.
Our data enable us to consider five borrower characteristics and the
down payment and maturity requirements associated with them.
Tables 18 through 22, on which the discussion will be based; are
derived from the tables in Appendix B which present the results of a
chi-square analysis of the significance of the relations considered. The
data pertain to contracts made in June 1953 and in July 1957. One of
their most striking features, but one which we shall ignore for the
moment, is the decrease in average down payment and the increase in
average maturity between these two dates. This change, which per-
vades all types of borrower groups, is far wider than any variation we
shall discover among the borrower groups at either date. Neverthe-
less, we shall for the present concentrate attention on the variations
among borrowers.
Table 18 shows a fairly consistent tendency for borrowers in the
lowest and in the highest income brackets to obtain shorter maturi-
ties, and the relation is statistically significant in both 1953 and 1957.
As for down payments, there appears to be no statistically significantConcept of Credit Quality 47
TABLE 18
Median Maturity and Down Payment, New-Automobile Contracts
Classified by Income of Borrower, 1953 and 1957,
A Large Sales Finance Company
Monthly Income JuneJuly June July
(dollars) 1953 1957 1953 1957
Median Number of
Maturity (mos.) Contracts
Under 250 20.1 37.0* 491 509
250—349 21.1 37.8* 1,245 1,609
350—499 21.2375* 1,475 3,315
500—999 20.3 36.1* 983 2,489
1,000 and over 19.7 3 1.3* 125 281
All contracts 20.8 37.2* 4,319 8,2Q3
Chi-square test S S
Median Number of
Down Payment (per cent) Contracts
Under 250 38.3 33.1 489 510
250—349 38.1 32.0 1,244 1,612
350—499 37.8 31.9 1,482 3,311
500—499 38.4 32.1 988 2,484
1,000 and over 38.6 32.9 123 278
All contracts 38.1 32.1 4,326 8,195
Chi-square test N N
Source Appendix Tables B-3 and B-4.
Chi-square test (S =significant,Nnot significant, at the .05
level) is based on data in the appendix tables.
*Median value falls in open-end class. Cf. note a, Table 16.
relationship to income, although in both years borrowers in the middle
income brackets made slightly smaller down payments (as a percent-
age of purchase price) than the lower or higher income groups, on the
average. Some further evidence on this point, pertaining to 1954—55
and utilized in another connection in Chapter 5, suggests that low in-48 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
TABLE 19
Median Maturity and Down Payment, New-Automobile Contracts
Classified by Sex of Borrower, 1953 and 1957,




































Source: Appendix Tables B-5 and B-6.
Chi-square test (S =significant,N =notsignificant, at the 0.5
level) is based on data in the appendix tables.
*Median value falls in open-end class. Cf. note a, Table 16.
come borrowers typically make smaller down payments than high
income borrowers, but that the longest maturities go to borrowers in
the middle income range.1° It does not appear, therefore, that credit
10Theproportions of new-auto contracts with low down payments and long
maturities are as follows (Tables 36 and 37):
Income of Borrower in
Year of Purchase
Under $3,000— $5,000— $7,500
$3,000 $4,999 $7,499d over
Percentage with:
Down payment under 30 per cent 59 55 53 48
Maturity 30 months and over 49 53 48 37Concept of Credit Quality 49
TABLE 20
Median Maturity and Down Payment, New-Automobile Contracts
Classified by Marital Status of Borrower, 1953 and 1957,







Median Maturity (mos.) Number of Contracts
Married 20.8 37.2* 3,779 7,215
Single 20.2 36.4* 790 1,244
Divorced-Widowed 28.1 a 15 a
All contracts 20.7 37.1* 4,584 8,459
Chi-square test S S
Median
Down Payment (per cent)Number of Contracts
Married 38.3 32.2 3,783 7,205
Single 38.8 32.1 792 1,246
Divorced-Widowed 33.8 a 16 a
All contracts 38.3 32.2 4,591 8,451
Chi-square test N N
Source: Appendix Tables B-7 and B-8. Chi-square (S =significant,
N =notsignificant, at the .05 level) is based on data in the appendix
tables.
aData not collected.
*Median value falls in open-end class. Cf. note a, Table 16.
agencies offset to any marked degree whatever greater risk is asso-
ciated with iow income borrowers by requiring higher down pay-
ments or shorter repayment periods, although there may be a modest
tendency of this sort, particularly with respect to maturities. As a rule,
the highest income groups make the largeit down payments and the
shortest commitments.
Here, as in the case of other borrower characteristics, itis im-
portant to bear in mind that the contracts being analyzed reflect the50 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
TABLE 21
Median Maturity and Down Payment, New-Automobile Contracts
Classified by Age of Borrower, 1953 and 1957,
A Large Sales Finance Company
June July June July
Age (yrs.) 1953 1957 1953 1957
Median Number of
Maturity (mos.) Contracts
3Oandunder 20.7 37•4* 1,452 2,678
31—40 21.1 .374* 1,446 2,774
41—50 20.4 36.6* 1,058 1,964
Over 50 20.1 36.0* 612 1,052
All contracts 20.7 37.1* 4,568 8,468
Chi-square test S S
Median Number of
Down Payment (per cent) Contracts
30 and over 35.7 31.4 1,450 2,679
31—40 39.0 31.9 1,450 2,765
41—50 38.8 32.6 1,061 1,959
Over 50 41.7 34.1 615 1,053
Allcontracts 38.3 32.1 4,576 8,456
Chi-squaretest S S
Source: Appendix Tables B-9 and B-10.
Chi-square test (Ssignificant, N =notsignificant, at the .05 level)
isbased on data in the appendix tables.
*Medianvalue falls in open-end class. Cf. note a, Table 16.
terms agreed upon by borrower and lender. Borrowers' demands are
tempered in the light of what terms are offered, and the offers are
governed in part by what borrowers demand. That the result of this
process can change dramatically is indicated by the marked shift be-
tween 1953 and 1957 in the terms accepted by both parties.
The terms of new-automobile contracts in our sample do not seem
to differ significantly according to whether the borrowers were menTABLE 22
Median Maturity and Down Payment, New-Automobile Contracts
Classified by Occupation of Borrower, 1953 and 1957,
A Large Sales Finance Company
June July June July




Operators 14.5 28.3 150 205
Wage earners 18.0 32.8 49 86
Non farm
Proprietors 19.5 33.7 493 632
Professional 20.2 35.3 269 462
Salaried 20.9 37•3* 1,544 2,809
Wage earners 21.4 37•5* 1,726 3,796
Miscellaneous 20.9 373* 346 492
All contracts 20.7 37.1* 4,577 8,482
Chi-square test S S
Median Number of
Down Payment (per cent) Contracts
Farm
Operators 42.1 38.0 148 213
Wage earners 41.0 35.0 48 88
Non farm
Proprietors 39.4 33.6 495 630
Professional 39.1 32.9 270 461
Salaried 37.6 31.2 1,540 2,795
Wage earners 38.2 32.1 1,728 3,791
Miscellaneous 37.6 32.8 350 490
All contracts 38.3 32.2 4,579 8,468
Chi-square test S S
Source: Appendix Tables B-il and B-12.
Chi-square test (S =significant,N =notsignificant, at the .05
level) is based on data in the appendix tables.
*Median value falls in open-end class. Cf. note, a, Table 16.52 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
or women, although the great majority of borrowers were men (Table
19). With regard to marital status, Table 20 suggests that while married
borrowers tend to obtain loans with significantly longer maturities, the
difference is not great. Moreover, marital status is not significantly
associated with stringent or liberal down payment terms. On. balance,
the evidence does not suggest that one can attach great importance to
the interrelation of loan terms with this borrower characteristic.
The classification of borrowers by age reveals consistent and signifi-
cant associations with loan terms. Younger borrowers obtain more
liberal terms, i.e., longer maturities as well as lower down payments.
This result appears both in 1953 and in 1957 (Table 21).
We find occupation to be one of the borrower characteristics most
consistently associated with loan terms. Table 22 indicates the median
down payment and the median maturity associated with each occupa-
tional class in the two periods. The most striking finding is that not
only are the maturities and down payments quite different for the
various occupations, but the longer maturities and smaller down pay-
ments are concentrated in the same occupational classes in both 1953
and 1957.
The shortest maturities and largest down payments, i.e., the most
conservative terms, are found in the farm operator group, with farm
wage earners next. Somewhat longer maturities and smaller down pay-
ments characterize the nonfarm proprietor and professional groups.
Salaried workers and nonfarm wage earners secure the easiest terms,
the salaried group making smaller down payments than the wage
earner group but receiving slightly shorter maturities, on the average.
These findings pertain to samples considered on a national basis, with-
out regard to the region where they originate. Analysis of separate
samples for each region yields broadly similar conclusions (Table 23).
The over-all conclusion which emerges from this examination of the
interrelationship of credit contract terms and borrower characteris-
tics is that terms vary systematically with the age and occupation of
the borrower, to a lesser extent with his income, and scarcely at all
with the borrower's sex or marital status. These results obtained both
before the extensive liberalizátiön of lending terms that occurred in
1954—55 as well as after. It is unfortunate thai data are not available to
test the relations of loan terms to the liquid asset holdings, net worth,
and life cycle status of the borrowers, because there is evidenceConcept of Credit Quality 53
thatthese borrower characteristics, as well as those we have just con-
sidered, are significantly related to collection experience (cf. Chapter
4). Moreover, it would be useful to study the impact on credit
quality of social and economic instability, as indicated by such factors
as the borrowers' length of residence, marital stability (divorce rate),
whether they live, in their own or a rented home, and the average
number of times the borrowers have changed employment in the re-
cent past. There is reason to think these factors might affect credit
quality, but we have not been able to examine the possible relation-
ships.
To return to the question asked at the beginning of this section: Is
consumer credit extended in such a way that liberality in one dimen-
sion is accompanied by liberality in another, or is it generally truç that
an easing in one direction is offset by tightening in another? We can
offer only a partial answer at this point. Although we have observed
some offsetting tendencies, for the most part easier down payments
and longer maturities go together. The relation of these factors, sepa-
rately and together, to credit risk will be examined in Chapter 3.
We have found also that easier terms are significantly associated with
certain borrower characteristics. Whether this association offsets or re-
inforces prospective lender risk must await the analysis of Chapter 4,
which examines the relation between borrower characteristics and col-
lection experience.T
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